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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoMi:-.1ERcE CLAUSE-STATE REGULATION OF lNTBRSTATB COMMERCE-The City of Madison enacted an ordinance prohibiting the
sale within the municipality's jurisdiction of milk not pasteurized and bottled
within five miles of the city's central square.1 Plaintiff, an Illinois corporation
engaged in distributing milk and milk products in Illinois and Wisconsin, had
its pasteurization plant in Illinois, approximately sixty-five miles from Madison.
After it had bee~ denied a permit to distribute milk in Madison, plaintiff
brought an action for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the ordinance.
The ordinance was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as a reasonable
exercise of the municipality's police power.2 On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed, Justices Black, Douglas and Minton dissenting.
The ordinance unduly burdens interstate commerce in view of the reasonable

1
2

General Ordinances of the City of Madison, 1949, §7.21.
257 Wis. 308, 43 N.W. (2d) 480 (1950).
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and adequate alternatives available. 3 Dean Milk Co. 11. City of Madison, Wisconsin, (U.S. 1951) 71 S.Ct. 295.
During the past decade the Supreme Court has been divided into three
camps on the question of the Court's function in enforcing the negative implications of the commerce clause against local attempts at regulation of interstate commerce. The traditional approach, which had been followed by the
Court since Cooley 11. Port Wardens,4 found its chief proponent in Chief Justice
Stone. Basically, Stone's position, as stated and developed in a series of majority opinions, involved a judicial balancing of interests.5 A distinction was
drawn between those aspects of interstate commerce which are fundamentally
national in scope and those which are of primarily local interest. If the state
regulation in question dealt with the former, the duty of the Court under the
Stone view was to strike it down as an encroachment on the powers of Congress
to determine national policy. 6 If the regulation dealt with the latter, it would
be upheld, provided it did not conllict with existing congressional legislation
and did not unduly burden or obstruct commerce.7 A second view is that of
Justice Jackson, who has been disturbed by the growing tendency of the states
to ''Balkanize" commerce through the imposition of numerous local trade barriers.8 In his opinion, the Court should invoke the commerce clause to strike
down all local regulations tending to "retard, burden or constrict'' the fl.ow of
commerce.9 The third position, taken by Justice Black with the consistent support of Justice Douglas, is that the constitutional grant of power over commerce
to Congress did not also pass a concurrent power to the Court to nullify state
regulations of commerce. Black's contention has been that the Court's only
function in applying the commerce clause to state legislation is to determine
whether it conllicts with congressional legislation or patently discriminates
against interstate commerce.10 If it does neither, Black would uphold it, on
the ground that any attempt to weigh the conllicting interests involved is a
3 For similar decisions in the state courts, see: La Franchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8
Cal. (2d) 331, 65 P. (2d) 1301 (1937); Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, 82 S.W. (2d)
283 (1935); Larson v. Minneapolis, 190 Minn. 138, 251 N.W. 121 (1933). See, also,
Miller v. Williams, (D.C. Md. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 236.
4 Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851).
5 See Stone's opinion in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct.
1515 (1945).
6 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra note 5; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
62 S.Ct. 164 (1941); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 60 S.Ct.
504 (1940).
7Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307 (1943); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314
U.S. 390, 62 S.Ct. 311 (1941); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S.Ct. 930
(1941); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg, 306 U.S. 346, 59 S.Ct. 528 (1939).
8 See the dissent in Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 68 S.Ct. 358
(1948); and the concurring opinion in Duckworth v. Arkansas, supra note 7.
9 This was essentially the position stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824). See, also, Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 245 (1829).
10 See the dissents in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra note 5; McCarroll v.
Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra note 6; Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S.
307, 58 S.Ct. 913 (1938).
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legislative function, to be left to Congress.11 Both Black's and Jackson's views
were confined to minority opinions until the death of Stone in 1946. After that
time, the Court seemed undecided as to which of the three courses it would
follow. There were hints that the Court might be willing to accept Black's view
and leave the problem in the hands of Congress.12 On the other hand, in Hood.
v. Dumond.,13 the majority went to the other extreme in endorsing the position
of Jackson.14 In the principal case, the Court seems to have returned, at least
temporarily, to the Stone view. The statute in question was struck down, but
not before the Court had carefully considered its effect on interstate commerce
on the one hand, as weighed against the benefits to local health and safety on
the other. The Court found that the regulation of municipal milk supplies is a
subject susceptible of reasonable local regulation, and that the regulation in
question did not conffict with existing federal legislation; hut it held that in view
of the available alternative means of assuring an adequate and healthful milk
supply,15 the benefit secured to the city by the regulation in question was outweighed by the burdens thereby placed on dealers engaged in interstate commerce. While the decision in one case is not conclusive, there are signs that the
principal case may represent a stabilization of the Court's position in this field,
and a recognition that the alternatives to the Stone view have proved inadequate.16 It now seems clear that to adopt Black's view would leave the states
free to erect multifarious trade barriers at will, hindered only by the sporadic
and necessarily piecemeal correction which Congress could administer. On the
other hand, to strike down mechanically all local burdens on interstate commerce
without regard to the confficting interests involved would leave large areas of
commerce free from any regulation whatever. In those areas as yet untouched
by federal legislation, questions will continue to arise as to when specific state
regulations are legitimate or are unduly discriminatory or burdensome on interllThis was the view of Chief Justice Taney. License Cases, 5 How. (46 U.S.) 504
(1947). FRANKFURTER, Tm! CoMMERCB CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE
50 (1937).
,
12 Capitol Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 70 S.Ct. 806 (1950); Kotch
v. Board of River Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552, 67 S.Ct. 910 (1947).
1s 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 657 (1949).
14 See Mendelson, "Recent Developments in State Power to Regulate and Tax Interstate Commerce," 98 Umv. PA. L. REv. 57 (1949).
1 5 The suggested alternatives were inspection of incoming milk supplies, with the
shippers paying the reasonable cost of such inspection, or the adoption of the Model Milk
Ordinance of the United States Public Health Service, which provides for common inspection standards among the participating municipalities. The dissent characterized the consideration of alternative methods of regulation as a new limitation on local police ,powers.
However, the availability of such alternatives seems to have been implicit in the consideration of many earlier cases in which local health regulations were struck down. Schoolenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 18 S.Ct. 757 (1898); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S.
313, 10 S.Ct. 862 (1890).
16 Justice Black has indicated his willingness to modify his position in Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66_ S.Ct. 1050 (1946), and in Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,
69_ S.Ct. 657 (1949). Justice Douglas has also apparently abandoned his former position,
having joined with the majority in Hood v. DuMond. Justice Jackson concurred in the
majority opinion in the principal case.
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state competition. By their nature they will be judicial questions, to be resolved
by a careful weighing of the interests involved, not by the application of mechanistic formulas going to either extreme. The decision in the principal case is an
encouraging indication that the Court is again prepared i:o assume its historic
duty of deciding those questions.

William O.,Allen

